For the social history of the present: Pierre Bourdieu as historical sociologist by Calhoun, Craig
  
Craig Calhoun 
For the social history of the present: Pierre 
Bourdieu as historical sociologist 
 
Book section 
 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Originally published in Calhoun, Craig (2013) For the social history of the present: Pierre 
Bourdieu as historical sociologist. In: Gorski, Philip S. , (ed.) Bourdieu and Historical Analysis. 
Politics, history, and culture. Duke University Press, Durham, USA, pp. 36-67. ISBN 
9780822352730  
 
© 2013 Duke University Press 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/48489/ 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: January 2016 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s submitted version of the book section. There may be differences 
between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the publisher’s 
version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 1 
Forthoming in Philip Gorski, ed.:  
Bourdieu, Theory and Historical Sociology (Duke 2012) 
 
For the Social History of the Present : 
Bourdieu as Historical Sociologist 
 
Craig Calhoun 
 
It is typical to approach the work of Pierre Bourdieu through the analytic concepts 
he made influential: habitus, symbolic violence, field, capital, practice and so forth. This 
is not inappropriate, but it does risk making these appear as components in an abstract 
theoretical system rather than as working concepts shaped by the contexts in they were 
deployed. Bourdieu’s work can also be described in terms of the wide range of topics he 
addressed: exchange relations, migrant labor, education, cultural hierarchies, social 
domination, art, and many more. Focusing on disparate topics has contributed, however, 
to a fragmentary reading of Bourdieu, connecting him to different subfields of sociology 
(or anthropology) rather than drawing on his work for help integrating social analysis.  
 
To bring out the core of Bourdieu’s analytic perspective it is helpful to see him as 
a historical sociologist. I obviously don’t mean that he inhabited a subdisciplinary 
specialty. Nor is the point just that Bourdieu’s concepts are useful to those doing 
historical analysis, though this is certainly true. I do not mean simply that several of his 
studies were based on historical research, though many were. I mean much more 
basically that social transformations – and their limits and unintended consequences – 
were core foci of his sociological project. 
 
It is true that Bourdieu was not always explicit about the historical specificity of 
his work, especially in his early work. He left ambiguity about when his analytic concepts 
were meant as universal, as general to modernity or states or capitalism, or as specific to 
a particular context (Calhoun 1993). It is also true of course that Bourdieu was shaped 
deeply by an ethnographic approach and by a variety of philosophical and theoretical 
resources. Nonetheless, I will suggest, grasping the way historical transformations shaped 
his approach does much to clarify it. 
 
Bourdieu’s engagement with four specific social transformations shaped both his 
theory and his empirical approach: 
 
(1) The way state power and market expansion and intensification produced a 
deracination or uprooting of “traditional” ways of life – specifically peasant life. 
Bourdieu explored how long-established practices and cultural systems worked in 
slow-changing societies in which neither state nor economy exerted a constant or 
differentiated influence, and then what happened to them in colonial Algeria, 
especially Kabylia, and in his own native region of the Béarn in the Pyrenees 
mountains of Southwest France. 
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(2) The creation of what other social theorists have called “modern” society by the 
differentiation of state and market power and more generally the making of fields. 
Bourdieu saw each field as a domain of relative autonomy marked off from others 
by its distinctive hierarchy, values, struggles, styles of improvising action, and 
forms of capital. He analyzed the genesis and structure of a wide range of fields 
from law and religion to art and literature, centrally in the 19
th
 and the first part of 
the 20
th
 centuries. Implicitly, he studied the production of a “fielded” society. 
 
(3) The great economic expansion and welfare state project of the post-WWII era. 
Called in France les Trente Glorieuses (the thirty glorious years) this was a period 
that promised greater equality, opportunity, and social participation but also 
reproduced old inequalities in new contexts and structures and often legitimated 
them by apparent meritocracy and the logic of individual responsibility for social 
fate. Bourdieu emphasized the false promises of equality but also the real 
investments people made even in institutions that didn’t live up to their promises.  
 
(4) The massive attack on the state, or more precisely on the idea that the state should 
act centrally to achieve social welfare, that is often called neoliberalism. Though 
this had older roots it came to the center of attention in the 1990s, sometimes 
appearing as an American model imposed on Europe. Neoliberalism portended a 
destruction of social fields, especially those dependent on public support, and a 
violent reduction of the pursuit of different values to brutal market logic. This 
turned Bourdieu’s attention more directly to what investment in different fields 
and the state itself had achieved, and what hopes they still offered – though also to 
the limits their frequent conservatism imposed on struggles for a better society. 
 
I shall present these not in chronological order, as above, but in the order of Bourdieu’s 
most sustained engagement with each – 1, 3, 2, 4 – though they overlap in his work. 
Algeria is the crucial starting point. 
 
 
Algeria: Tradition, Uprooting, Old Practices and New Logics 
 
In 1955, Bourdieu was sent to do military service in Algeria late in the era of 
French colonial rule. He stayed on to teach at the University of Algiers and became a 
self-taught ethnographer. Bourdieu did not simply study Algeria; he rather sought out its 
internal variants, regional and “minority” communities that were stigmatized and 
marginalized not only by French colonialism but also by the construction of Algerian 
national identity as modern and Arab in opposition to rural, tribal, and traditional. 
Sociologie d’Algerie, Bourdieu’s first book, describes in some detail not only “Arabic-
speaking peoples” (especially along the coast and in the central plain) but also Kabyles, 
Shawia, and Mozabites—each of which groups had its own distinct culture and 
traditional social order though both colonialism and market transformations were 
disrupting each and along with opposition to French rule pulling members of each into a 
new, more unified “Algerian” system of social relations.1  
                                                 
1
 Bourdieu, Sociologie d’Algerie, Paris: PUF, 1958. 
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Behind Bourdieu’s studies of social change, thus, was an account of the 
traditional “other” to modernization, the less rapidly changing peasant culture and 
economy. It is informative to recall that the Kabyle were Durkheim’s primary exemplars 
of traditional, segmentary social organization in The Elementary Forms of Religious Life 
and thus already had a role in France as representative of a certain ‘type’ of the 
premodern.
2
 But at the same time, the very term “Kabyle” (the name for the group 
Bourdieu studied most) is derived from the Arabic word for tribe, and marks a similar 
view from the vantage point of Arab modernity. It was an ascribed identity, a reminder of 
marginalization, even if it is now claimed. The Kabyle were dominated by France and by 
the dominant Algerians alike, yet they were being drawn into a new order, uprooted from 
traditional agricultural occupations and ways of life, working at a disadvantage in cities 
and struggling to keep communities together in the countryside. This double domination 
informed both Bourdieu’s analyses of Algeria and his development of a theory of 
symbolic violence.
3
  
 
Conducting research in Kabyle villages and with Berber-speaking labor migrants 
to the fast-growing cities of the Algeria’s coastal regions, Bourdieu addressed themes 
from the introduction of money into marriage negotiations to cosmology and the 
agricultural calendar, and the economic crisis facing those who are forced into market 
relations for which they are not prepared.
4
 Bourdieu proved himself an extraordinarily 
keen observer of the interpenetration of large-scale social change and the struggles and 
solidarities of daily life. Among other reasons, his native familiarity with the peasant 
society of Béarn gave him an affinity with the traditional agrarian societies of rural 
Algeria that were being destroyed by French colonialism.  
 
With Abdelmalek Sayad, Bourdieu studied peasant life and participation in the 
new cash economy that threatened and changed it.
5
 He studied the difficult situation of 
those who chose to work in the modern economy and found themselves transformed into 
its “underclass”, not even able to gain the full status of proletarians because of the ethno-
                                                 
2
 Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (New York: Free Press, 1997; orig. 1912).  
3
 At the same time, Bourdieu’s account exaggerated and sometimes idealized the stability and autonomy of 
traditional Kabyle society in order to make a sharper contrast to the social upheavals of colonial Algeria. 
Indeed, his account was based on reconstructions articulated by Kabyles who were situated in a kind of 
“structural nostalgia” as they contemplated the relationship between their traditional ways of life and both 
forced resettlement by the French and the difficulties of life as urban labor migrants; on structural nostalgis 
see Michael Herzfeld, Cultural Intimacy. London: Routledge, 1997; on this dimension of Bourdieu’s 
account see Paul Silverstein, “Of Rooting and Uprooting: Kabyle Habitus, Domesticity, and Structural 
Nostalgia,” Ethnography 2004). 
4
  See Outline of a Theory of Practice, Algeria 1960 and Bourdieu and Sayad, Le Déracinement.  
5
 Bourdieu and Sayad, Le déracinement, la crise de l'agriculture en Algerie. Paris: Editions de Minuit, 
1964. An exceptional scholar in his own right, Sayad remained a close friend and interlocutor of 
Bourdieu’s until his death in 1998. See Emmanuelle Saada, “Abdelmalek Sayad and the Double Absence : 
Toward a Total Sociology of Immigration,” French Politics, Culture, and Society 18 (2000) #1: 28-47; 
Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant,  “The Organic Ethnologist of Algerian Migration,” Ethnography, 1 (2000) 
#2: 173-82.; Bourdieu’s introduction to Sayad, La double absence: Des illusions de l’émigré aux 
souffrances de l’immigré. Paris: Seuil, 1999. 
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national biases of the French colonialists.
6
 Yet at the same time, he found people 
unwittingly collaborating in their own disadvantages, reinforcing by misrecognition what 
was forced on them by circumstance.  
 
Bourdieu initially represented the lives of the “original” inhabitants of Algeria in 
fairly conventional terms, echoing many aspects of the more critical end of the 
modernization theories of the day. Increasingly, though, he began to develop not only a 
challenge to the idea of benign modernization, but a much richer and more sophisticated 
analysis of how a traditional order could be created such that it reproduced itself with 
impressive efficacy without any conscious intention to do so, template for the 
reproduction, or exercise of power in its pursuit. This was made possible, Bourdieu 
argued, by the very organization of social practices, combining the symbolic and the 
material seamlessly in a “polythetic” consciousness, and inculcating practical orientations 
to actions in the young through experiences repeated in everyday life. The spatial 
organization of the household and the calendar of agricultural production, thus, were not 
only “cultural” choices or responses to material conditions, they were media of 
instruction organizing the ways in which the world appeared to members of the society 
and the ways in which each could imagine himself and improvise action.
7
 This social 
order did not admit of divisions into different fields of activity with different specific 
forms of value or claims on the loyalties of members. Kinship, poetry, religion, and 
agriculture were not distinct, thus, as family, art, religion and the economy were in more 
“modern” societies. Kabyle could thus live in a doxic attitude, reproducing understanding 
of the world as simply the taken-for-granted way it must be, while the development of 
discrete fields was linked to the production of orthodoxies and heterodoxies, competing 
claims to right knowledge and true value.  
  
Recognizing that the traditional order was sustained not by simple inertia or the 
force of cultural rules, Bourdieu turned attention to the ways in which continuous human 
effort, vigilance towards ‘proper’ action that was simultaneously an aspect of effective 
play of the game, achieved reproduction. Analyzing the traditional Kabyle idea of honor 
(nif), for example, Bourdieu realized that this was both the focus of long-term 
investments (hence a form of cultural capital) and at risk in every interaction. Nif was 
constitutive for the very sense of self as a “man of honor” (and indeed profoundly 
gendered). Sustaining nif demanded a sense of appropriate timing, judgment not just 
following rules. This was a game peasants could play effectively in their villages. They 
were prepared for it not only by explicit teaching but also by learning from all their 
practical experiences—usually not explicitly but tacitly, deployed in proverbs and 
cultural analogies or embodied as “second nature” or habitus. The same people who 
could play the games of honor with consummate subtlety in peasant villages, however, 
often found themselves incapacitated by the games of rationalized exchange in the cities. 
Labor migration and integration into the larger state and market thus stripped peasant 
habituses of their efficacy and indeed made the very efforts that previously had sustained 
                                                 
6
 Bourdieu, Sociologie d’Algerie, Paris: PUF, 1958; Bourdieu, P., Darbel, A. Rivet, J-P. and Seibel, C. 
Travail et travailleurs en Algerie. Paris and The Hague: Mouton, this ed. 1995; orig. 1963.   
7
 Both are reproduced in Outline. The analysis of the Kabyle house is one of the classics of structuralism. 
Originally written in 1963-4, it was first published in 1969 in an homage to Lévi-Strauss.  
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village life and traditional culture potentially counterproductive. Both the accumulated 
cultural capital and the sense of self were violently devalued. 
 
More generally, most Berbers had at best weak preparation for participation in the 
‘modern’ society of Algeria—notably the fields of economy and politics. Apparent 
opportunities were in fact undercut by when they did not deal with such inequalities of 
preparation to take advantage of them. At first, Bourdieu looked to education as a vehicle 
for equipping the marginal and dominated with the capacity to compete effectively in the 
new order.
 8
 Eventually, he saw education as more contradictory—providing necessary 
tools but only in a system that reinforced and legitimated subordination. Kablyes and 
other Berbers not only wound up dominated, but colluded in their own subjugation 
because of the ways in which they felt themselves to be different and disabled. 
Experience constantly taught the lesson that there was no way for “people like us” to 
succeed. Occasional exceptions were more easily explained away than the ubiquitous 
reinforcement that inculcated pessimism as habitus. Feeling fundamentally ill-equipped 
for the undertakings of Algeria’s new “modern” sector, they transformed a fact of 
discrimination into a principle of self-exclusion and reduced ambition.  
 
This was a theme to which Bourdieu returned in his studies of the village culture 
of Béarn in the 1960s. If his rural youth attuned him to certain aspects of Algerian 
experience, his analyses of Algeria opened his eyes to key dimensions of the world of his 
own youth, in which his family still lived. Bourdieu took up a variety of themes from 
matrimonial strategies to gender relations. Writing of bachelors at a rural village ball, he 
observed peasant men standing back from the dance, seemingly shy, unable or unwilling 
to approach attractive girls who had found work and new aspirations in the expanding 
economy of nearby cities. The bachelors literally embodied the contradictions of social 
change as they came to judge their own bodies as rough and clumsy by urban standards, 
not least the standards of women they might have wished to marry but who embraced 
new opportunities as well as new cultural styles.
9
 
 
Bourdieu fused ethnography and statistics, theory and observation, to begin 
crafting a distinctive approach to social inquiry aimed at informing progressive politics 
through scientific production. In some ways, it may have helped to be self-taught because 
this encouraged Bourdieu to ignore some of the artificial oppositions structuring the 
social sciences—e.g., between quantitative and qualitative inquiry. Research also gave 
Bourdieu an approach to practical action at a time when he felt caught uncertainly 
between political camps. At one point he drew heavily on Fanon, for example, and then 
vehemently rejected the revolutionary politics that had initially attracted him, seeing it as 
                                                 
8
 For decades Bourdieu quietly supported students from Kabylia in the pursuit of higher education, a fact 
that speaks not only to his private generosity and sense of obligation, but to his faith that, for all their 
complicity in social reproduction, education and science remained the best hope for loosening the yoke of 
domination. He also helped Berber emigrants in Paris found a research center, "CERAM" (Centre de 
Recherches et d'Etudes Amazighes), and was a founder of a prominent support group for imprisoned and 
threatened Algerian intellectuals (CISIA, Comité de soutien aux intellectuels algériens).  
9
  Bourdieu published several articles on these themes, and left a more extended, book-length treatment, Le 
Bal des célibataires: crise de la société paysanne en Béarn (Paris: Seuil, 2002) in press at his death. 
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naively and sometimes dangerously romantic.
10
 Convinced that total revolution was 
impossible, but also that the French state was insupportable, Bourdieu sought—without 
complete success—an approach that would give adequate weight to the power of social 
reproduction without simply affirming it. 
 
At the heart of Bourdieu’s approach to practice lay the notion of “habitus”. The 
concept is old, rooted in Aristotle’s notion of bodily “hexis” and transmuted and 
transmitted by Thomas Aquinas in his approach to learning and memory. It is used by a 
range of modern thinkers including Hegel, Husserl, and Mauss. Norbert Elias had 
recovered the term to help grasp the transformations of manners in modern European 
history.
11
 Bourdieu’s concept was specifically more social and more bodily than, say, 
Husserl’s usage which focused on the background understandings latent in any act. 
Though Husserl understood action (including perception) in individual and cognitive 
terms, he did stress the importance of dispositions and horizons of potential acts. 
Merleau-Ponty was a more proximate source for Bourdieu, who stressed the generative 
role of the habitus, the ways in which embodied knowledge transmutes past experience 
into dispositions for particular sorts of action, not only in familiar but less effectively also 
in new situations.  
The conditionings associated with a particular class of conditions of 
existence produce habitus, systems of durable, transposable dispositions, 
structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that 
is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations 
that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a 
conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations 
necessary in order to attain them. Objectively ‘regulated’ and ‘regular’ 
without being in any way the product of obedience to rules, they can be 
collectively orchestrated without being the product of the organizing 
action of a conductor.
12
  
 
Habitus is important to the project of understanding how a traditional society 
works – how honor is achieved and respect demonstrated, for example, in ways that can 
never be reduced to or reproduced by following rules. But it is not a concept limited to or 
definitive of traditional social order. In all settings people improvise new actions based 
on past learnings embodied as habits and seldom made explicit. And in times of transition 
some suffer difficulties in generating appropriate actions for new circumstances. If 
habitus is central to mastery – whether of a craft or of social games – it is also central to 
subordination. People learn from past experience, for example, to limit their own 
                                                 
10
 See Bourdieu, “The Revolution in the Revolution.” There is useful discussion in Jeremy Lane, Pierre 
Bourdieu: A Critical Introduction. London: Pluto, 2000. 
11
 Bourdieu seems not to have been aware of Elias until much later. See Roger Chartier, “Social Figuration 
and Habitus,” pp. 71-94 in Cultural History (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988). Elias and Bourdieu 
share a variety of themes, tastes, and some other concepts, though there are also striking differences. Not 
the least of the latter is the extent to which Elias focused on long-term historical change, whereas Bourdieu, 
while dealing intensively with shorter-term processes of change often left questions of large-scale, epochal 
historical change implicit. See Calhoun, “Habitus, Field of Power and Capital:  The Question of Historical 
Specificity," in Critical Social Theory, Oxford: Blackwell, 1995. 
12
 Logic of Practice, p. 53. 
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aspirations. Habitus is an internalization of social structure and a capacity to generate 
creative responses. Even the responses that succeed in breaking with some dimensions of 
old structures or in adapting to new circumstances remain marked by learning that 
situates individuals in structures and shapes their trajectories through them. Habitus is a 
condition of doing anything and at the same a powerful factor in the reproduction of 
established patterns of action. Among other things, the habitus can lead to a 
naturalization and internalization of the inequalities also reproduced by symbolic 
violence. 
 
With concepts like habitus and also symbolic violence and power, Bourdieu 
sought a way to move beyond the dualisms of structure and action, objective and 
subjective, social physics and social semiotics and especially to inject a stronger account 
of temporality (and temporal contingency) into social analysis.
13
 His effort was not 
merely to forge a theoretical synthesis, but to develop the capacity to overcome some of 
the opposition between theoretical knowledge based on objectification of social life and 
phenomenological efforts to grasp its embodied experience and (re)production in action. 
Human social action is at once “structured” and “structuring,” Bourdieu argued, indeed 
structuring because it is structured, with the socialized body as “analogical operator of 
practice.” Habitus is internalized experience, embodied culture and history. 
 
There exists, thus, no simple context-free or transhistorical ‘solution’ to the riddle 
of structure and agency. Rather, their mutual constitution and subsequent interaction must 
be worked out in analysis of concrete empirical cases. In his analyses of Algeria, 
Bourdieu is attentive to contemporary history – French colonialism, expanding markets, 
urbanization – but does not delve into the history of Kabylia. He allows it to appear 
largely as the traditional, unchanging other to the historical transition he studies.
14
 This is 
not equally true in his studies of France, where he works by reconstituting, first, the 
social genesis and makeup of objective social worlds (fields) within which agents 
develop and operate, second, the socially constituted dispositions (habitus) which fashion 
the manner of thinking, feeling, and acting of these agents. This “double historicization” 
calls for field and habitus to be related in analysis of specific temporal processes and 
trajectories. Moreover, it must be complemented by the historicization of the analytic 
categories and problematics of the inquiring scholar. Only in this way can social 
scientists do the necessary, if hard, labor of “conquering and constructing social facts”—
that is, of distinguishing the hidden forms and mechanisms of social reality from the 
                                                 
13
 Bridget Fowler (Pierre Bourdieu and Cultural Theory. London: Sage, 1977, p. 16) rather strangely sees 
the concept of practice as “associated with [Bourdieu’s] conversion to structuralism” thus missing some of 
the other sources on which it drew-notably Marx and Marxism, but also a tradition from Aristotle through 
phenomenology--and the extent to which it marked an effort to transcend limits of structuralism. 
14
 This is not to say that Bourdieu is unaware of earlier patterns of change, but rather that he emphasizes the 
attitude he would come to describe (following Aristotle) as doxa. This is the un-self-aware inhabitation of 
culture as taken-for-granted reality that is disrupted by heterodoxy. Orthodoxy may present itself as an 
attempt to return to earlier “tradition” but generally cannot re-establish the doxic attitude, it can only restate 
some contents in a contention with heterodoxy and an effort to enforce cultural conformity. See also 
Weber, ‘The Social Psychology of the World Religions’, in H.H. Gerth and C. W. Mills, From Max Weber: 
Essays in Sociology (London: Routledge. 1951; orig. 1915), p. 296, on the difference between tradition and 
traditionalism.  
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received understandings of previous academic knowledge, folk knowledge and the 
everyday preconceptions of “culture” more generally. On this basis, empirically-based 
reflexive analysis can also establish the social and epistemological conditions for both the 
objective and subjective perspectives themselves, and for avoiding the pitfalls of what 
Bourdieu later termed “the scholastic bias” – the tendency of social analysts to project 
their own (hermeneutic) relation to the social world into the minds of the people they 
observe.
15
  
 
These studies helped forge Bourdieu’s theory of practice and informed his entire 
intellectual trajectory, including both academic endeavors and his later political critique 
of neoliberalism. Near the end of his life, he wrote: 
As I was able to observe in Algeria, the unification of the economic field tends, 
especially through monetary unification and the generalization of monetary 
exchanges that follow, to hurl all social agents into an economic game for which 
they are not equally prepared and equipped, culturally and economically. It tends 
by the same token to submit them to standards objectively imposed by 
competition from more efficient productive forces and modes of production, as 
can readily be seen with small rural producers who are more and more completely 
torn away from self-sufficiency. In short, unification benefits the dominant.”16 
Unification, of course, could be a project not only of the colonial state but also of national 
states, the European community, and the World Trade Organization.   
 
 
Les Trente Glorieuses: Education, Inequality and Reproduction 
 
 When Bourdieu returned to France, the post-war economic boom was in full 
swing. Urbanization was extremely rapid. Home ownership was on the rise. Personal 
consumption was expanding rapidly. Widespread ownership of cars, for example, offered 
both convenience and a sense of movement into the middle class and at the same time, 
expanded the distances within which village and small town residents could work. New 
hobbies like photography spread.
17
 At the same time, the distinctive European welfare 
state model was being created; France was a leading exemplar. Social mobility and 
greater equality were promised. Expanding educational opportunities was a central part of 
the promise.  
  
In 1964, in collaboration with Jean-Claude Passeron, Bourdieu published The 
Inheritors, the first of several ground-breaking studies of schools, cultural distinction and 
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 This is discussed in several places; for a general treatment see chapter 6, “The Scholastic Point of View,” 
in Practical Reason. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998. 
16
 Pierre Bourdieu, “Unifying to Better Dominate,” Items and Issues, winter 2001; orig. 2000 (forthcoming 
in Firing Back, New York: New Press, 2002. 
17
 Bourdieu’s study of photography is precisely of the “middle-brow” art of these hobbyists. He also 
studied museum attendance and other kinds of growing cultural engagement, though generally finding that 
despite expanding numbers stratification remained powerful. See Bourdieu, Pierre, Luc Boltaski, Robert 
Castel, J-C. Chamboredon, and D. Schnapper, Photography: A Middlebrow Art. Cambridge: Polity, 
1965/1990; orig. 1965; Bourdieu, Pierre, Alain Darbel and Dominique Schnapper, The Love of Art. 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990; orig. 1966. 
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class division.
18
 The theme was straightforward but powerful. Education appeared to be 
neutral and available on an open meritocratic basis, but in fact it reproduced class bias. It 
did this partly by embracing hierarchy and distributing success in ways that rewarded 
prior family accumulation and transmission of cultural capital. Schooling thus achieved 
its apparent meritocracy by an act of symbolic violence; it legitimized the prevailing 
social order by manipulating the categories through which it was produced and 
reproduced. Pedagogical work imposed a “cultural arbitrary” but made it appear neutral 
or universal. Familiarity with bourgeois language for example translated into differences 
in performance on academic tests. Read in English narrowly as texts in the sociology or 
anthropology of education, The Inheritors and Reproduction were also more general 
challenges to the French state; Bourdieu saw the sociology of education not simply as a 
specialized pursuit but at the very core of sociology because of the insight it offered into 
the reproduction of inequality in modern societies as they came to rely more and more on 
both credentials reflecting specialized training and the certification of high levels of 
attainment of canonical general knowledge - culture.  
 
In France, the national education system stood as perhaps the supreme exemplar 
of the pretended seamless unity and neutrality of the state in its simultaneous roles as 
representative of the nation and embodiment of reason and progress. Bourdieu showed 
not merely that it was biased (a fact potentially corrigible) but that it was in principle 
biased. This was read by some as a blanket condemnation; Bourdieu was seen nearly as 
anti-schooling. Bourdieu’s disappointment was in fact more complicated. He worried 
later that this loose reading of his work encouraged teachers simply to adopt lax standards 
in order not to be seen (or see themselves) as the agents of symbolic violence. Poor 
teaching or weak standards did not eliminate class inequality, after all. In fact, it reduced 
the extent to which schools could provide students with a chance to overcome inherited, 
familial differences in cultural capital.  
 
Bourdieu’s early work on Algeria suggests that he started out with a conviction 
that reformed educational institutions and access could provide the dominated and 
marginalized with effective resources for political and economic participation. They 
might remedy the poor preparation of ex-peasants for the new commercial society and 
post-colonial politics. If only they could be organized to provide fair, open, and effective 
access to high value cultural goods, he implied in concert with many educational 
reformers, then educational institutions could be the crucial means for improving society. 
By the mid-1960s, however, he saw educations failing to play this role.
19
 This was not 
narrowly a failing of schools, however, but a contribution of the educational field to the 
field of power more generally – a contribution organized in part by the ways in which 
schools and teachers related to the overall organization of cultural hierarchy, markets, and 
especially the state. Schools were organized not merely to teach, after all, but to perform 
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 Bourdieu, Pierre and J.-C. Passeron, The Inheritors. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973; orig. 
1964; Bourdieu, Pierre and J.-C. Passeron, Reproduction: In Education, Culture, and Society. Beverly 
Hills: Sage, 1971; orig. 1967. 
19
 See Robbins, The Work of Pierre Bourdieu, ch. 4. Grenfell, Michael 2004 Pierre Bourdieu: Agent 
Provocateur. New York: Continuum. 
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selection and exclusion. They simultaneously maintained and disguised the class 
structure. This was an issue that Bourdieu addressed in a range of further works including 
books on higher education and of course Distinction, his great study of the hierarchical 
organization of cultural taste. Education did not have to be merely a process of 
reproduction; but it would take self-conscious reform, reform aided by the reflexive view 
sociological research provided, to change this outcome. This, of course, would also 
require political will.  
 
Bourdieu’s views of the educational system reflected the disappointed idealism of 
one who had invested himself deeply in it, and owed much of his own rise from 
provincial obscurity to Parisian prominence to success in school. As he wrote in Homo 
Academicus, he was like someone who believed in a religious vocation then found the 
church to be corrupt. “The special place held in my work by a somewhat singular 
sociology of the university institution is no doubt explained by the peculiar force with 
which I felt the need to gain rational control over the disappointment felt by an ‘oblate’ 
faced with the annihilation of the truths and values to which he was destined and 
dedicated, rather than take refuge in feelings of self-destructive resentment.”20 The 
disappointment could not be undone, but it could be turned to understanding and 
potentially, through that understanding, to positive change. 
 
Educational institutions were central to Bourdieu’s concern, but his sense of 
disappointment and his critical analyses both reached widely. All the institutions of 
modernity, including the capitalist market and the state itself, share in a tendency to 
promise far more than they deliver. They present themselves as working for the common 
good, but in fact reproduce social inequalities. They present themselves as agents of 
freedom, but in fact are organizations of power. They inspire devotion from those who 
want richer, freer lives, and they disappoint them with the limits they impose and the 
violence they deploy.  
 
In educational institutions, particular systems of categories, contents, and 
outcomes are presented as necessary and neutral (and one senses Bourdieu’s outrage at 
professors who can’t see the system reflexively and critically even while he explains their 
complacency and incapacity). Forming the taxonomic order of both the way academics 
think and the way the system is organized, these impressively protect against internal 
critique and therefore against successful reform and improvement.  
The homology between the structures of the educational system (hierarchy of 
disciplines, of sections, etc.) and the mental structures of the agents (professorial 
taxonomies) is the source of the functioning of the consecration of the social order 
which the education system performs behind its mask of neutrality.
21
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In short, the educational system is a field. It has a substantial autonomy, which it must 
protect, and a distinctive form of capital which depends on that autonomy for its efficacy. 
It is internally organized as a set of transposable dispositions and practical taxonomies 
that enable participants to understand their world and to take effective actions, but which 
also produce and reproduce specific inequalities among them and make these appear 
natural. These can be challenged—as indeed Bourdieu challenged them by analyzing 
them—but it should not be thought that they could be easily changed by a simple act of 
will. And it is externally productive, providing the larger field of power with one of its 
most powerful legitimations through the process of the conversion of educational capital 
into more directly economic, political, or other forms. 
 
This happens, like much else, through the dialectic of incorporation and 
objectification.
22
 The education system depends on the inculcation of its categories as the 
mental structures of agents and on the simultaneous manifestation of these as material 
structures of organization. This enables the production of objective effects that do not 
cease to be objective and materially powerful simply by pointing to the subjective 
moments in their creation. It is true that there is “symbolic aggression observable in all 
examination situations” (and Bourdieu goes to great lengths to document and analyze 
such things as the terms teachers use in commenting on examination papers) but it is not 
true that this is explicable simply as the psychological attitude of individual agents. 
Rather, it is a disposition inculcated by agents’ own trajectories through the educational 
field (as students as well as teachers) and both reproduced and rendered apparently 
neutral by its match to the categories of organization and value in the field as a whole.  
 
More generally, the social order is effectively consecrated through the educational 
system because it is able to appear as neutral and necessary. In one of Bourdieu’s favorite 
metaphors for describing his own work, Mao’s notion of “twisting the stick in the other 
direction”, he turned the structuralist analysis of taxonomies in another way by 
mobilizing it for a critical account of the logic of practice.
23
 In the context of les trentes 
glorieuses, this was central to showing how certain organizations of inequality could 
produce compliance rather than protest, and to exposing the false promises of visions that 
a rising tide lifts all boats – which helped his work contribute in due course to protest. For 
Bourdieu it was especially important to analyze the idealization of culture because it 
figured centrally in French nationalism and the legitimation of both state power and 
market expansion. De Gaulle first established France’s Ministry of Culture in 1959, 
appointing André Malraux to head it and charging it with both celebration of high culture 
and production of a cohesive account of Frenchness through an inventory of the heritage 
each locality brought to the whole. When Bourdieu undertook to demonstrate that culture 
was not a realm of simple disinterested ideals but rather one that operated on the base of 
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its own economy, albeit one that reversed certain evaluative premises of the “business” 
economy, this was not simply an exercise in value-neutral sociology of culture but a 
politically salient engagement with continuing transformations in French society.
24
 
    
Bourdieu’s studies of education were thus part of a broader approach to culture, 
power, and inequality. Informed also by a series of empirical studies of art and artistic 
institutions starting in the 1960s,
25
 this line of work is most widely known through 
Distinction, Bourdieu’s monumental study of the social organization of taste. The politics 
and historical context of this body of work are not always clear. It is work that comes to 
terms with historically transformed structures of class inequality, and explores the 
potential for new kinds of struggles over inequality. These could include direct action like 
strikes but also necessary would need to include struggles over classification.  
 
 Distinction is an analysis of how culture figures in social inequality and how the 
pursuit of distinction or differential recognition shapes all realms of social practice. It is 
also an effort to “move beyond the opposition between objectivist theories which identify 
the social classes (but also the age or sex classes) with discrete groups, simple countable 
populations separated by boundaries objectively drawn in reality, and subjectivist (or 
marginalist) theories which reduce the ‘social order’ to a sort of collective classification 
obtained by aggregating the individual classifications or, more precisely, the individual 
strategies, classified and classifying, through which agents class themselves and 
others”.26 Bourdieu develops, thus, an argument that struggles over classification are 
themselves important and largely ignored aspects of class struggle, though also struggles 
that must include questioning conventional, inherited definitions of class. Here Bourdieu 
is not only bringing in Weberian attention to prestige, but addressing the changes in 
structures of inequality wrought by credentialism, professionalization of work, the 
delivery of state welfare services – and the list would eventually include questions of 
citizenship and the status of immigrants. 
 
Bourdieu drew from structuralism many specifics of his argument that 
classification is materially efficacious. But classification is, for Bourdieu, an exercise of 
political power and potentially challengeable by a political—and also cultural—struggle. 
In a sense he offered a more precise and empirical account of the production of 
hegemony than Gramsci – or than Althusser’s notion of ideological state apparatuses. 
This is not the impersonal “power” of Foucault, but a more directly transitive power, 
wielded by agents in defense of their interests and support of their projects. As Bourdieu 
was fond of pointing out, the root of ‘categorize” also means to accuse and deployment of 
categories was often an act of symbolic violence.  
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Distinction, however, is also a response to Kant’s Third Critique (and to 
subsequent philosophical disquisitions on judgment).
27
 Much as Durkheim had sought to 
challenge individualistic explanation of social facts,
28
 so Bourdieu sought to uncover the 
social roots and organization of all forms of judgment. Kant’s argument had sought an 
approximation in practical reason to the universality available more readily to pure 
reason. He had seen this as crucial equally to artistic taste and political opinion. But he 
had imagined a standpoint of disinterested judgment from which practical reason (and 
critique) might proceed. Bourdieu clearly accepted the analogy between art and politics, 
but not this idea of disinterest or of a place outside social struggles from which neutral 
knowledge might issue. If he shared this critique of ostensible neutrality with Foucault 
and other poststructuralists, he differed importantly in arguing that knowledge not only 
buttresses the hierarchies of the social world but also can be an effective part of the 
struggle to change that world, even if it is never produced from a standpoint outside it. 
The world-as-it-is-perceived issues out of and bolsters the world-as-it-is, a struggle over 
classification may actually change the world, and—this was crucial for Bourdieu—that 
struggle need not be simply a matter of power but can be through science a matter of 
knowledge which transcends mere power even if it does not escape struggles over power 
and recognition altogether. In short, we needn’t go down the ostensibly Nietzschean path 
towards a choice between simple embrace of the will to power or a futile resistance to it. 
On the contrary, “there is, as Nietzsche pointed out, no immaculate conception; but nor is 
there any original sin – and the discovery that someone who discovered the truth had an 
interest in doing so in no way diminishes his discovery.”29  
 
If philosophy and art—and at least to some extent science30--operate with a denial 
of interest, economics and less academic discourses about economic matters clearly 
embrace interest. But they operate with a presumption of neutrality and objectivity that 
renders them vulnerable to a closely related critique. For if the cultural world is the 
economic world reversed, as Bourdieu famously put it
31
, it is also true that liberal 
economics turns precisely on the denial of cultural significance, the positing of 
“interests” as objective, and the perception of economic systems as matters of necessity 
rather than products of choice and power (and therefore potentially to be improved by 
struggle). There is no disinterested account of interests, no neutral and objective 
standpoint from which to evaluate policy, not even academic economics.
32
 But this 
doesn’t remove economic matters from science, it simply extends the demand for a truly 
reflexive social science, and for an overcoming of the oppositions between structure and 
action, objective and subjective to economics and economic analysis. The economy has 
no more existence separate from or prior to the rest of society than do art or philosophy. 
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It is not merely ‘necessity’, to which we may only adapt, any more than artistic creativity 
is simply ‘freedom’ with no social base.  
 
 
Fields and Forms of Capital 
 
Bourdieu was hardly anti-culture. The point of exposing the misrecognition of its 
character was not to debunk it but to make possible radically different social relations to 
it. Just as Marx argued that capitalism produced wealth that it could not effectively 
distribute to all its participants, so Bourdieu argued that artists produce work of great 
value. Likewise, science and education do in fact produce and reproduce knowledge. But 
in the social structures of modern society, they do so inseparably from inequalities in 
capacity and opportunity to appropriate that knowledge:  
Economic power lies not in wealth but in the relationship between wealth and a 
field of economic relations, the constitution of which is inseparable from the 
development of a body of specialized agents, with specific interests; it is in this 
relationship that wealth is constituted, in the form of capital, that is, as the 
instrument for appropriating the institutional equipment and the mechanisms 
indispensable to the functioning of the field, and thereby also appropriating the 
profits from it.
33
  
It would make no sense to start socialism—or any more egalitarian society—by willfully 
abolishing all the material wealth accumulated under capitalism and previous economic 
systems. But it would be necessary to transform the system of relations that rendered 
such wealth as capital and distributed it unequally. Knowledge constitutes a specific form 
of capital, a kind of resource deployed by those with power in relation to specific fields—
legal, medical, academic. But knowledge need not be organized this way. 
 
Simply to attack modernity is to engage in “self-destructive resentment”. Rather, 
the best way forward lies through the struggle to understand, to win deeper truths, and to 
remove legitimacy from the practices by which power mystifies itself. In this way, one 
can challenge the myths and deceptions of modernity, enlightenment, and civilization 
without becoming the enemy of the hopes they offer. Central to this is renewed 
appreciation of both the autonomy and distinctive character of the scientific field and of 
the contributions it can make to public discourse: 
It is necessary today to reconnect with the 19
th
 century tradition of a 
scientific field that, refusing to leave the world to the blind forces of the 
economy, wished to extend to the whole social world the values of the 
(undoubtedly idealized) scientific world (Bourdieu 2001: 8). 
 
Bourdieu’s exploration of the operation of different forms of power blossomed 
into a full-fledged model of the relations between economic, cultural, social and symbolic 
capital in the deployment of strategies of class reproduction. This perhaps reached its 
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fullest development in his study of the grands écoles and the political and economic 
power structure of the elite professions.
34
  
 
As Bourdieu’s analysis of the limits of les trente glorieuses matured, he became 
increasingly engaged in the analysis of social fields. This led him to questions about the 
historical genesis and structure of such fields. This was basic to further development of 
his account of the different forms of capital and their convertibility and led him to deeper 
historical inquiry. In addition to the book-length works on education and art, Bourdieu 
published shorter but still extensive studies of the religious, scientific, philosophical, and 
juridical fields.
35
 In these and other investigations, he laid the basis for a general theory 
of “fields” as differentiated social microcosms operating as spaces of objectives forces 
and arenas of struggle over value that refract and transmute external determinations and 
interests. This became increasingly a theory of the distinctive nature of modern society as 
“fielded” society, organized by the ways in which fields worked internally, related to 
each other, and mediated the influences of state and market.  
 
If Bourdieu’s interest in his early studies of education was in the way an 
established field was adapted to a new context, and reorganized to reproduce inequality, 
increasingly his gaze turned to the ways in which fields developed and took on their 
characteristic structures. This took Bourdieu into the study of longer-term historical 
transformations – as the modern French religious field was shaped by a long Catholic 
history, the Protestant Reformation, the creation of a state church and secular opposition 
to it. In this connection, he introduced the notion of “structuration” (later appropriated by 
Anthony Giddens) to call attention to the fact that cultural and social structures were 
always incompletely solidified and thus potentially changing.
36
 Fields represent 
Bourdieu’s specification of what Weber called the different value-spheres of modern 
society. But he sees these as always objects and sites of struggle. 
 
The existence of a field stems first and foremost from a claim to a distinctive kind 
of value – and to a distinctive capacity to provide that value to society more generally. 
This capacity implies field-specific knowledge and other resources – capital - and it 
implies a division of labor among fields. Lawyers should govern matters of justice, 
scientists matters of truth, priests access to salvation and real-estate agents the sale of 
homes. The implicit premise of every field is that it needs autonomy since outsiders 
lacking its specific knowledge will not be able to judge the quality of internal production. 
Outsiders buying medical services pay more for the labor of those held in high regard by 
other doctors; absent this field-specific hierarchy they might pay less but risk substandard 
care. Succeeding in such a claim to autonomy, Bourdieu argued, is the “critical phase” in 
the emergence of a field.
37
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The external autonomy is linked to an internal hierarchy where esteem is often the 
immediate basis for standing, but greater command of the field’s specific sort of good is 
the underlying basis. Fields are thus in certain ways conservative, but not entirely so. 
Each harnesses the efforts of its members to the production of its distinctive sort of good 
because that is the main way in which they can get ahead in the race for field-specific 
distinction, capital. Of course, there may well be inequality in excess of meaningful 
differences in actual provision of the good the field values. More basically, the definition 
of each field embodies a cultural arbitrary – a historically achieved demarcation that did 
not have to exist in that form. These can be challenged; their seeming necessity can be 
unmasked. But at the same time, fields are productive; they organize the actual delivery 
of distinctive goods. To abolish them without providing a new structure for the provision 
of important goods would be devastating.  
 
Fields claim monopolies. These may be protected by the state – through licensing, 
examinations, funding, or other procedures. A state church enforces the monopoly of a 
particular set of theological and ritual specialists on the provision of the goods of religion 
within that country. Each monopoly is quite precisely a limit on market transactions – 
and the devaluation of field-specific goods that would take place if the “best” or 
dominant versions were not distinctively rewarded. Of course these limits are variable; it 
is easier to enter some fields than others. But each field maintains at least autonomy from 
reduction to unmediated markets, often with the aid of the state. But as Protestants, Jews, 
or Muslims may seek to evade state imposed Catholic religious monopolies so buyers of 
alternative medicines seek to evade medical monopolies, and homeowners putting out 
their own advertisements seek to evade the monopolies of the real estate profession. 
Those dominant within a field also need to convert their field-specific capital into money 
(the universal solvent) or perhaps directly into other sorts of capital through something 
closer to barter arrangements – as parental status may help children get into more 
selective schools. But they need this conversion to be mediated by the field’s own status 
hierarchy. Within every field there are some more attentive to external arbiters of value 
or providers of resource – the state or market actors – and others more focused on the 
“pure” form of the field’s specific value. Valuing “art for art’s sake” is thus crucial to the 
existence of a field of art, even if it may sometimes be hard to convert the “symbolic” 
capital of fellow-artists’ esteem into case.  
 
Historically, thus, fields represent successful projects to organize effort and 
aspirations into the pursuit of specific values and rewards related to those values. They 
are not necessarily fair and the pursuit of field-specific standing may distort the 
distribution of socially valued goods – as Bourdieu argument was the case in education.  
  
“A capital does not exist and function except in relation to a field” (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 1992: 101). Yet, successful lawyers and successful authors both, for example, 
seek to convert their own successes into improved standards of living and chances for 
their children. To do so, they must convert the capital specific to their field of endeavor 
into other forms. In addition to material property (economic capital), families may 
accumulate networks of connections (social capital) and prestige (cultural capital) by the 
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way in which they raise children and plan their marriages. In each case, the accumulation 
has to be reproduced in every generation or it is lost.  
 
Capital is Bourdieu’s term for resources that structure what is possible for 
different individuals or groups to do, and that form the “stakes” of social struggles. 
Capital comes in different forms – social, symbolic, and cultural as well as materially 
economic. Who you know can be a resource just like a bank account, and some people 
network very consciously to build social capital. Material, economic capital is especially 
important in modern societies – though so are educational credentials. Different forms of 
capital are convertible, as for example rich parents can buy their children education at 
expensive universities. Public institutions (like schools or museums) and cultural values 
(like beauty or justice) work to limit immediate dominance of economic capital over all 
other kinds. Nonetheless, capitalism (in Marx’s sense of a system in which accumulation 
of wealth based on the conversion of human labor into commodities becomes an end in 
itself) is for Bourdieu a tendency in modern life that threatens to dominate. But people 
still accumulate other sorts of capital, sometimes by explicitly rejecting economic values, 
as an artist may gain symbolic credit for demonstrating devotion purely to aesthetics and 
popularizing his work for sales. Because of the importance of capital, inequalities are 
basic to social life. Capital is both necessary for individual action and built into the 
structure of collective action so that people are embedded in competition and 
accumulation even without conceptualizing them as such or forming conscious 
intentions.  
There are two senses in which capital is converted from one form to another. One 
is as part of the intergenerational reproduction of capital. Rich people try to make sure 
that their children go to good colleges—which, in fact, are often expensive private 
colleges (at least in America). This is a way of converting money into cultural capital 
(educational credentials). In this form, it can be passed on and potentially reconverted 
into economic form. The second sense of conversion of capital is more immediate. The 
athlete with great successes and capital specific to his or her sporting field – prestige, 
fame - may convert this into money by signing agreements to endorse products, or by 
opening businesses like car dealerships or insurance agencies in which celebrity status in 
the athletic field may help to attract customers.  
 
Bourdieu’s deepest work on fields, as well as his most sustained historical 
research, focused on literature and was capped by The Rules of Art, an investigation of 
the symbolic revolution wrought in literature by Flaubert, Baudelaire and others.
38
 
Bourdieu’s greatest unfinished work is probably its companion study, a sociogenetic 
dissection of Manet and the transformation of the field of painting in which he played a 
pivotal role. Both center on the organization of cultural production in the late 19
th
 century 
era when the French state also took on its modern form (secularizing definitively, 
establishing its monopoly and standardization of education, and so forth). 
 
It is worth focusing on Rules of Art in more detail. In it Bourdieu addresses the 
point at which the writing of “realistic” novels separated itself simultaneously from the 
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broader cultural field and the immediate rival of journalism. He takes up the specific 
empirical case of Gustave Flaubert and his career in relation to the constitution of the 
field as such and the broader patterns implicit in it. The emphasis on Flaubert was, among 
other things, a riposte to and (often implicit) critical engagement with Sartre’s famous 
largely psychological analysis. The Rules of Art contested the view of artistic 
achievement as disinterested, and a matter simply of individual genius and creative 
impulses. It showed genius to lie in the ability to play the game that defines a field, as 
well as in aesthetic vision or originality.  
Flaubert was the mid-19
th
 century writer who, more than anyone else with the 
possible exception of Baudelaire, created the exemplary image of the author as an artistic 
creator working in an autonomous literary field. The author was not merely a writer 
acting on behalf of other interests: politics, say, or money. A journalist was such a paid 
writer, responsible to those who hired him. An author, by contrast, was an artist. This was 
the key point for Flaubert and for the literary field that developed around and after him. 
What the artistic field demanded was not just talent, or vision, but a commitment to “art 
for art’s sake”. This meant producing works specifically for the field of art.  
Writers like Flaubert and Baudelaire made strong claims for the value of their 
distinctive points of view. This has encouraged the analysis of their products as simply 
embodiments of their psychological individuality. On the other hand, they wrote 
“realistic” novels, engaging the social issues of their day from poverty to the Revolution 
of 1848. This has encouraged others to focus on the ways in which they reflected one or 
another side in those issues, interpreting them, for example, as social critics or as voices 
of the rising middle class. Bourdieu showed how this misses the decisive importance of 
the creation of a field of literature as art. This meant, first, that when Flaubert or 
Baudelaire wrote about the issues of their day, they claimed the distinctive authority of 
artists. Indeed, they helped to pioneer the idea that artists might offer a special 
contribution to social awareness that reflected precisely their “disinterestedness”—in 
other words the fact they were not simply political actors. Secondly, though, Bourdieu 
showed that this appearance of disinterestedness is misleading. It is produced to the 
extent that artists are motivated by interests specific to the artistic field and their place 
within it, and not merely serving as spokespeople for other social positions. In other 
words, artists are disinterested in the terms of some other fields precisely because of the 
extent to which they are interested in the field of art. The autonomy of this field is thus 
basic to the production of artists in this sense.  
Painting as a modern artistic field is defined by the difference between producing 
“art for its own sake” and producing art for the sake of religion, as in medieval 
decorations of churches, or for the sake of memory and money, as in some portraiture 
(Bourdieu 1983/1993). The new more autonomous approach does not mean that the 
painter stops wanting food, or fame, or salvation—though he may not consciously 
recognize how much he is driven by these desires. Rather, what it does is orient his 
creative work specifically to the field of art, and to the standards of judgment of others in 
that field. The artist in this sense doesn’t just produce more of what the market wants, but 
endeavors to create works that embody his own distinctive vision and place in the field. 
He seeks recognition from other artists, and in his work marks off his debts to but also 
distinctions from them. It is because it becomes a field in this way, oriented to an internal 
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communication and accumulation of specifically artistic capital, that the production of art 
becomes partially autonomous from popular and even elite tastes. Art may guide tastes 
(not just be guided by them), or it may operate outside the world of everyday tastes, but it 
may not be reduced to them. This liberates art from determination by its immediate social 
context, but it does not liberate artists from all interests in achieving distinction or 
accumulating capital. On the contrary, they are driven to innovate (rather than just 
reproducing the masterworks of a previous generation), and to innovate in ways that 
derive much of their form from the existing state of communication in the art field. The 
artistic habitus, thus, enables a regulated improvisation, working with the symbolic 
materials at hand to express at once the artist’s original vision and the artist’s individual 
claims on the field of art. Because the art field is autonomous, its works can only be 
understood by those who master its internal forms of communication. This is why 
ordinary people find much modern art hard to understand, at least until they take classes 
or read the guiding statements offered by museum curators. From the mid-19
th
 century, 
art could become increasingly abstract partly because it was the production not simply of 
beauty, or of a mirror on the world, but of a communication among artists. This 
communication was driven simultaneously by the pursuit of distinction and of art for art’s 
sake. 
 When we set out to understand the “creative project” or distinctive point of view 
of an artist like Flaubert, therefore, the first thing we need to grasp is his place in and 
trajectory through the field of art (or the more specific field of literature as art). This, 
Bourdieu recognizes, must seem like heresy to those who believe in the individualistic 
ideal of artistic genius. It is one thing to say that sociology can help us understand art 
markets, but this is a claim that sociology is not just helpful for but crucial to 
understanding the individual work of art and the point of view of the artist who created it. 
Bourdieu takes on this task in an analysis simultaneously of Flaubert’s career, or his own 
implicit analysis of it in the novel Sentimental Education, and of the genesis and structure 
of the French literary field. In doing so, he accepts a challenge similar to that Durkheim 
(1897) took in seeking to explain suicide sociologically: to demonstrate the power of 
sociology in a domain normally understood in precisely antisociological terms. 
 At its center of Bourdieu’s analysis lies the demonstration that Flaubert’s point of 
view as an artist is shaped by his objective position in the artistic field and his more 
subjective position-takings in relation to the development of that field. For example, it is 
important that Flaubert came from a family that was able to provide him with financial 
support. This enabled him to participate fully in the ethic (or interest) of art for art’s sake 
while some of his colleagues (perhaps equally talented) were forced to support 
themselves by writing journalism for money. This is different from saying simply that 
Flaubert expressed a middle class point of view. In fact, it suggests something of why 
middle and upper class people who enter into careers (like art) that are defined by cultural 
rather than economic capital often become social critics. Their family backgrounds help 
to buy them some autonomy from the immediate interests of the economy, while their 
pursuit of distinction in a cultural field gives them an interest in producing innovative or 
incisive views of the world. In other words, the objective features of an artist’s 
background influence his work not so much directly as indirectly through the mediation 
of the artistic field.  
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Within that field, the artist occupies a specific position at any one point in time, 
and also a trajectory of positions through time. The position of an individual artist is 
shaped by the network of relationships that connect him to (or differentiate him from) 
other artists and by his position in the hierarchies of artistic producers defined both by the 
external market and the internal prestige system of the field. The actual position the artist 
occupies, however, is only one among a universe of possible positions. He could have 
made different friends and enemies, could have used his talent better or worse at earlier 
times, could have traveled abroad rather than staying in Paris. In this sense, the artist’s 
biography (including both the objective resources he starts with and the uses he makes of 
them) describes a trajectory through the space of objective positions in the field (which 
itself may be developing and changing). This trajectory is produced partially by choices 
and by the way the artist played the game, as well as by material factors. At the same 
time, as we saw in considering the habitus, the way the artist plays the game is itself 
shaped by the objective circumstances he has experienced. As he sets out to produce any 
new work, the artist starts from an objective position in the field, and also engages in new 
“position-takings”. That is, he chooses consciously or unconsciously from among the 
range of possible moves open to him. 
In line with Bourdieu’s overall approach, what we see here is the deep way in 
which subjective and objective dimensions of fields and practices are bound up with each 
other. “Paradoxically,” he writes, “ we can only be sure of some chance of participating 
in the author’s subjective intention (or, if you like, in what I have called elsewhere his 
‘creative project’) provided we complete the long work of objectification necessary to 
reconstruct the universe of positions within which he was situated and where what he 
wanted to do was defined” (Bourdieu 1992/1996: 88). One important way in which the 
field as a whole shapes the work of a Flaubert, say, is by granting him the freedom to 
innovate, and to construct a vision of the world that is not immediately constrained by 
economic logic or political power. In other words, the artist gains his freedom in relation 
to his broader social context precisely by accepting the determinations that come with 
investment in the artistic field. “The posts of ‘pure’ writer and artist, like that of 
‘intellectual’, are institutions of freedom, which are constructed against the ‘bourgeoisie’ 
(in the artist’s terms) and, more concretely, against the market and state bureaucracies 
(academies, salons, etc.) through a series of ruptures, partially cumulative, which are 
often made possible only by a diversion of the resources of the market—hence of the 
‘bourgeoisie’—and even of state bureaucracies.” That is, the pure writer needs resources 
from somewhere. “These posts are the end point of all the collective work which has led 
to the constitution of the field of cultural production as a space independent of the 
economy and politics; but, in return, this work of emancipation cannot be carried out or 
extended unless the post finds an agent endowed with the required dispositions, such as 
an indifference to profit and a propensity to make risky investments, as well as the 
properties which, like income, constitute the (external) conditions of these dispositions” 
(Bourdieu 1992/1996: 257). 
In this sense, the artist is not so much “disinterested” as “differently interested”. 
The illusion of disinterest is produced by the way economic and cultural dimensions of 
modern societies are ideologically opposed to each other. The field of cultural production 
is defined as the economic world reversed (Bourdieu 1993, ch. 1). It is one of the central 
contributions of Bourdieu’s theory, however, to show that this is a misrecognition, and 
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the opposition is really between different forms of capital. Directly economic capital 
operates in a money-based market that can be indefinitely extended. Cultural capital, by 
contrast, operates as a matter of status, which is often recognized only within specific 
fields (here again, Bourdieu follows Weber).  
 
 
Contesting Neoliberalism: Sociology in Action 
 
Bourdieu did not develop any detailed account of “the economy” as such, partly 
because his concerns lay elsewhere and partly because he questioned whether any such 
object existed with the degree of autonomy from the rest of social life that conventional 
economics implied.
39
 His account of the different forms of capital, thus, involved no 
account of capitalism as a distinctive, historically specific system of production and 
distribution. This was perhaps implied by his treatment of the corrosive force of markets 
in Algeria and by his critique of neoliberal economic policies. In each case the more 
inclusive, larger-scale organization of economic life also entailed a greater reduction of 
other values to economic ones (and a specification of economic values as those of private 
property). “Economism is a form of ethnocentrism,” Bourdieu wrote. It removes the 
elements of time and uncertainty from symbolically organized exchange; it desocializes 
transactions leaving, as Bourdieu follows Marx (and Carlyle) in saying, no other nexus 
between man and man than “callous cash payment”. It treats pre-capitalist economies 
through the categories and concepts proper to capitalism.
40
 Among other things, this 
means introducing what Bourdieu calls “monothetic” reason, in which analysts imagine 
that ‘social’ can only mean or actors only intend one thing at a time. Precapitalist thought 
in general, and much ordinary thought even in capitalist societies is, Bourdieu suggests, 
polythetic, constantly deploying multiple meanings of the same object. “Practice has a 
logic which is not that of the logician.”41 It puts symbols and knowledge together 
“practically,” that is, in a philosophically unrigorous but convenient way for practical 
use. 
 
Bourdieu devoted a good deal of effort to challenging such economism. But he 
did this not to suggest an alternative view of human nature in which competition did not 
matter so much as an alternative view of the social world in which other kinds of “goods” 
and relationships were the objects of investment and accumulation. This led him into the 
influential idea of different partially convertible forms of capital: notably cultural, social, 
and symbolic.  
The social world can be conceived as a multi-dimensional space that can be 
constructed empirically by discovering the main factors of differentiation which 
account for the differences observed in a given social universe, or, in other words, 
by discovering the powers or forms of capital which are or can become efficient, 
like aces in a game of cards, in this particular universe, that is, in the struggle (or 
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competition) for the appropriation of scarce goods of which this universe is the 
site.  It follows that the structure of this space is given by the distribution of the 
various forms of capital, that is, by the distribution of the properties which are 
active within the universe under study--those properties capable of conferring 
strength, power and consequently profit on their holder. ... these fundamental 
social powers are, according to my empirical investigations, firstly economic 
capital, in its various kinds; secondly cultural capital or better, informational 
capital, again in its different kinds; and thirdly two forms of capital that are very 
strongly correlated, social capital, which consists of resources based on 
connections and group membership, and symbolic capital, which is the form the 
different types of capital take once they are perceived and recognized as 
legitimate.
42
 
Economic capital is that which is "immediately and directly convertible into money."
43
 
Educational credentials (cultural capital) or social connections (social capital) can only be 
converted indirectly, through engagement in activities that involve longer-term 
relationships: employment, family and marriage, etc. Different social fields create and 
value specific kinds of capital, and if economic capital has a certain primacy for 
Bourdieu, it is not dominant in all fields and its role may in varying degree be denied or 
misrecognized.  
 
Bourdieu’s analytic focus is more on showing that what economism takes as the 
universal characteristic of human nature—material, individual self-interest—is in fact 
historically arbitrary, a particular historical construction. “A general science of the 
economy of practices,” thus, would “not artificially limit itself to those practices that are 
socially recognized as economic.” It would “endeavor to grasp capital, that ‘energy of 
social physics’ in all of its different forms, and to uncover the laws that regulate their 
conversion from one into another.”44 Capital is analogous to energy, thus, and both to 
power. But, “the existence of symbolic capital, that is, of ‘material’ capital misrecognized 
and thus recognized, though it does not invalidate the analogy between capital and 
energy, does remind us that social science is not a social physics; that the acts of 
cognition that are implied in misrecognition and recognition are part of social reality and 
that the socially constituted subjectivity that produces them belongs to objective 
reality.”45  
 
Science—including sociology and anthropology—was for Bourdieu a practical 
enterprise, an active, ongoing practice of research and analysis (modus operandi), not 
simply a body of scholastic principles (opus operatum). It was no accident that he titled 
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his book of epistemological and methodological preliminaries The Craft of Sociology.
46
 
The craft worker is always a lover of knowledge; the craft itself is precisely a store of 
knowledge, yet it is never fully discursive and available for explicit transmission as such. 
Masters teach their skills by example and coaching, knowing that know-how cannot be 
reduced to instructions, and never escapes its situated and embodied character. Like 
habitus, “the rules of art” is a phrase that signifies practical knowledge, learning-by-
doing, tacit understanding, like the knowledge of cooking embodied in a grandmother’s 
demonstrations and guidance rather than a cookbook. Art can never be reduced to 
following set rules and yet to say it is without coherence, strategy or intention or not 
based on social organized and shared knowledge would be to misunderstand it utterly. 
Neither is science simply the value-free expression of “truth.” It is a project, but one 
organized, ideally, in a social field that rewards the production of verifiable and forever 
revisable truths—including new truths and new approaches to understanding--and not 
merely performance according to explicit rules and standards.
47
 It is a project that 
depends crucially on reason as an institutionally embedded and historically achieved 
capacity, and therefore refuses equally the rationalistic reduction of reason to rules, 
simple determinism’s unreasoned acceptance of the status quo, and the expressive appeal 
to insight supposedly transcending history and not corrigible by reason.  
 
At the same time, Bourdieu was actively engaged with historical struggles and 
transformations. He was political throughout his career, though only from the 1990s did 
he make a primary focus of public activities like marches and the writing of polemical 
essays. Part of what changed was his openness to a style from which he had distanced 
himself, decrying the example Sartre set of a “general intellectual” with opinions on 
everything. But another part of what changed was the context. Bourdieu say the rise of 
neoliberalism as a basic challenge to the era of the welfare state and economic expansion 
he had spent most of his career analyzing. The new context and new issues – like the 
plight of undocumented workers - made protest politics compelling. The failure of the 
socialist party to rise to the new challenges made them necessary. 
 
In resistance to neoliberalism and related public issues like the rights of 
immigrants, Bourdieu shifted his personal style of engagement. He marched; he signed 
petitions; he wrote polemical essays (more than before).
48
 But despite the stylistic shifts, 
Bourdieu’s political actions were fully consistent with and understandable in terms of his 
scientific sociology (see Wacquant 2005). Bourdieu’s challenge to threatened collapse 
between political and economic – and indeed, scientific and economic - fields in the 
1990s and early 2000s is of a piece with his rejection of a collapse between academic and 
political fields in 1968 and both are informed by his theory of quasi-autonomous social 
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fields and by his analysis of the disruption of traditional life and marginalization of 
former peasants in Algeria.  
 
Bourdieu’s analyses thus lay the basis for an empirical science that would address 
the practices of knowledge at the same time as it produced knowledge of social practice. 
The issue remained central in his challenge to neoliberalism: 
The implicit philosophy of the economy, and of the rapport between economy and 
politics, is a political vision that leads to the establishment of an unbreachable 
frontier between the economic, regulated by the fluid and efficient mechanisms of 
the market, and the social, home to the unpredictable arbitrariness of tradition, 
power, and passions.
49
  
This “frontier” is reinforced by both academic preconceptions and folk understandings, 
and structures the apparently objective categories and findings of economic analysis.
50
 As 
the habitus internalizes history and makes it seem natural, so do the categories of 
academic thought. The production of knowledge structured by such presupposed 
categories undergirds the failure to take seriously the social costs of neoliberalism, the 
social conditions on which such an economy depends, and the possibilities of developing 
less damaging alternatives. 
 
Bourdieu drew on his earlier analyses of how the culturally arbitrary (and often 
materially unequal) comes to appear as natural and fair to inform his critique of the 
imposition of neoliberal economic regimes. Rhetoric and specific patterns of social 
relations and state action were deployed to make it seem necessary to abandon the gains 
of long social struggles in order to compete with Asia, to integrate with Europe, or to 
benefit from new technologies. Imposition of the “American model” of dismantling or 
reducing state institutions was given the appearance of false necessity. And so Bourdieu 
took care to emphasize another side from his earlier arguments during les trentes 
glorieuses. He insisted that institutions like education do provide opportunities for 
ordinary people even while in their existing form they reproduce distinctions like that of 
ordinary from extraordinary.
51
  
 
 
 
In order to contest neoliberal orthodoxy and the paradoxical collapse of much 
poststructuralism into it, we need to inquire into the very construction of “the social”—
that is, of human life understood relationally. Bourdieu’s theory is not the last word on 
this, but it is a crucial starting point for investigating how the social is built and rebuilt in 
everyday practice, and how the basic categories of knowledge are embedded in this. 
Bourdieu’s work at its most basic is a challenge to false oppositions: the interested and 
disinterested, the individual and the collective, and the socio-cultural and the economic. 
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“A presupposition which is the basis of all the presuppositions of economics” is that “a 
radical separation is made between the economic and the social, which is left to one side, 
abandoned to sociologists, as a kind of reject”52 This in turn undergirds “a political vision 
that leads to the establishment of an unbreachable frontier between the economic, 
regulated by the fluid and efficient mechanisms of the market, and the social, home to the 
unpredictable arbitrariness of tradition, power, and passions.
53
 Economics is able to claim 
a falsely asocial (and acultural) individual subject, and the social (including culture) is 
posited as the non-economic realm (the realm at once the economically unimportant and 
of the pure aesthetic--never a true commodity but claimable only after the fact as an 
economic good). When the production of knowledge is structured by such presupposed 
categories, failure to take seriously the social costs of neoliberalism, the social conditions 
on which such an economy depends, and the possibilities of developing less damaging 
alternatives is almost inevitable.   
 
Indeed, it was as a social scientist that Bourdieu in the last years of his life turned 
to analyze the impacts of neoliberal globalization on culture, politics, and society. “The 
social sciences, which alone can unmask and counter the completely new strategies of 
domination which they sometimes help to inspire and to arm, will more than ever have to 
choose which side they are on: either they place their rational instruments of knowledge 
at the service of ever more rationalized domination, or they rationally analyse domination 
and more especially the contribution which rational knowledge can make to de facto 
monopolization of the profits of universal reason.”54 Though he was accused of simply 
adopting the mediatic throne Sartre and Foucault had occupied before—and certainly he 
never fully escaped from that mediatic version of politics--he offered a different 
definition of what a “public intellectual” might be. Citing the American term, he wrote of 
“one who relies in political struggle on his competence and specific authority, and the 
values associated with the exercise of his profession, like the values of truth or 
disinterest, or, in other terms, someone who goes onto the terrain of politics without 
abandoning the requirements and competences of the researcher”.55 He contrasts such a 
“specific intellectual” to the “general intellectual” (Sartre was the obvious model) who 
spoke on all matters claiming a right conferred more by personal eminence or 
authenticity than by professional expertise or perspective. If the tradition of Zola 
legitimates intellectual as political forces in France, it was nonetheless important to 
recognize the difference between simply claiming a new sort of aristocratic-clerical right 
to speak in public, and bringing analyses with specific scholarly bases into public debate.  
 
Bourdieu was famous long before the struggle against neliberal globalization of 
the 1990s. In June 1968, some students had actually carried copies of his book, The 
Inheritors, onto the barricades. But Bourdieu had stayed more or less apart from that 
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struggle, turning his attention to scientific—albeit critical--research. Some of this 
research produced Homo Academicus, a book partly about the relationship between the 
university microcosm and the larger field of power in 1968, but the book appeared over 
fifteen years later.
56
 One reason Bourdieu was not a vocal public activist in 1968 was that 
he did not think the crucial issues of power and inequality were well-joined in the 
struggles of that year. Neither their romanticism nor the predominant versions of 
Marxism appealed to him, and he resisted especially leftist tendencies to collapse the 
scientific and political fields. Moreover, he worried that naïve overoptimism encouraged 
actions that would set back rather than advance the causes of liberation and knowledge. 
Not least of all, there was a superabundance of symbolically prominent intellectuals in 
1968. By the early 1990s this was no longer so. Sartre and Foucault were both dead, and 
a number of others had abandoned the public forum or simply appeared small within it.  
 
  
Basic to Bourdieu’s interventions as a public intellectual, in this sense, was the 
importance of creating the possibility of collective choice where the dominant discourse 
described only the impositions of necessity. In the context of the Yugoslav wars of the 
1990s, for example, Bourdieu challenged the idea that the choices of European citizens 
were limited to passivity before the horrors of ethnic cleansing or support for the 
American-led NATO policy of high-altitude bombing.
57
 More prominently, especially 
from the early 1990s, Bourdieu worked to protect the achievements of the social struggles 
of the twentieth century -- pensions, job security, open access to higher education and 
other provisions of the social state -- against budget cuts and other attacks in the name of 
free markets and international competition. In the process, he became one of the world’s 
most famous critics of neoliberal globalization.
58
 He challenged the neoliberal idea that a 
specific model of reduction in state action, enhancement of private property, and freedom 
for capital was a necessary response to globalization (itself conceived as a quasi-natural 
force).  
 
Calling this the “American model” annoyed Americans who wished to distance 
themselves from government and corporate policies. The label nonetheless captured a 
worldwide trend toward commodification, state deregulation, and competitive 
individualism exemplified and aggressively promoted by the dominant class of the 
United States at the end of the 20
th
 century. Bourdieu identified this American model 
with five features of American culture and society which were widely proposed as 
necessary to successful globalization in other contexts: (1) a weak state, (2) an extreme 
development of the spirit of capitalism, and (3) the cult of individualism, (4) exaltation of 
dynamism for its own sake, and (5) neo-Darwinism with its notion of self-help.
59
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Whatever the label, Bourdieu meant the view that institutions developed out of a 
long century of social struggles should be scrapped if they could not meet the test of 
market viability. Many of these, including schools and universities, are state institutions. 
As he demonstrated in much of his work, they are far from perfect. Nonetheless, 
collective struggles have grudgingly and gradually opened them to a degree to the 
dominated, workers, women, ethnic minorities, and others. These institutions and this 
openness are fragile social achievements that open up the possibility of more equality and 
justice, and to sacrifice them is to step backwards, whether this step is masked by a 
deterministic analysis of the “market” or a naked assertion of self-interest by the wealthy 
and powerful. This does not mean that defense must be blind, but it does mean that 
resistance to neoliberal globalization, even when couched in the apparently backward-
looking rhetoric of nationalism, can be a protection of genuine gains and indeed, a 
protection of the public space for further progressive struggles.   
 
Bourdieu was concerned above all that the social institutions that supported 
reason—by providing scholars, scientists, artists, and writers, with a measure of 
autonomy--were under unprecedented attack. Reduction to the market threatened to 
undermine science; reduction to the audience-ratings logic of television entertainment 
threatened to undermine public discourse. “If one wants to go beyond preaching, then it is 
necessary to implement practically … the Realpolitik of reason aimed at setting up or 
reinforcing, within the political field, the mechanisms capable of imposing the sanctions, 
as far as possible automatic ones, that would tend to discourage deviations from the 
democratic norm (such as the corruption of elected representatives) and to encourage or 
impose the appropriate behaviors; aimed also at favouring the setting up of non-distorted 
social structures of communication between the holders of power and the citizens, in 
particular though a constant struggle for the independence of the media.”60 The problem 
was not internationalization as such. Bourdieu himself called forcefully for a new 
internationalism, saw science as an international endeavor, and founded Liber, a 
European review of books published in six languages. The problem was the presentation 
of a particular modality of “globalization” as a force of necessity to which there was no 
alternative but adaptation and acceptance.  
 
In his own life, Bourdieu recognized, it was not merely talent and effort that 
propelled his extraordinary ascent from rural Béarn to the Collège de France, but also 
state scholarships, social rights, and educational access to the closed world of “culture.” 
This recognition did not stop him from critical analysis. He showed how the 
classificatory systems operating in these institutions of state, culture, and education all 
served to exercise symbolic violence as well as and perhaps more than to open 
opportunities. But he also recognized the deep social investment in such institutions that 
was inescapably inculcated in people whose life trajectories depended them: “what 
individuals and groups invest in the particular meaning they give to common 
classificatory systems by the use they make of them is infinitely more than their ‘interest’ 
in the usual sense of the term; it is their whole social being, everything which defines 
their own idea of themselves…”61  
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Neoliberal reforms, thus, not only threaten some people with material economic 
harms, they threaten social institutions that enable people to make sense of their lives. 
That these institutions are flawed is a reason to transform them (and the classificatory 
schemes central to their operation and reproduction). It is not a basis for imagining that 
people can live without them, especially in the absence of some suitable replacements. 
Moreover, the dismantling of such institutions is specifically disempowering, not only 
economically depriving. That is, it not only takes away material goods in which people 
have an “interest”, it undercuts their ability to make sense of their social situation and 
create solidarities with others. 
 
A central strength of global capitalism is its ability to control the terms of 
discourse, and most especially, to present the specific emerging forms of globalization as 
both inevitable and progressive. Consider the force of this message in the rhetoric of the 
European Union and the advocates of a common currency. Globalization appears as a 
determinant force, an inevitable necessity to which Europeans must adapt; capitalism 
appears as its essential character; the American model is commonly presented as the 
‘normal’ if not the only model. Yet European unification is held to be liberal, 
cosmopolitan, and progressive.
62
 To assert as Bourdieu did that the specific pattern of 
international relations—like relations within nations—is the result of the exercise of 
power is to open up the game, to remove the illusion of necessity. To reveal the power 
being wielded and reproduced when apparently open political choices are structured by a 
symbolic order organized to the benefit of those in dominant positions, whether or not 
they are fully aware of what they do, is to challenge the efficacy of doxic understandings. 
These are basic acts of critical theory, and both consistent with and informed by 
Bourdieu’s work since his early Algerian studies.   
 
Conclusion 
 
Bourdieu’s approach was to rethink major philosophical themes and issues by 
means of empirical observation and analyses rooted in “a practical sense of theoretical 
things” rather than through purely theoretical disquisition.63 Only relatively late, in 
Pascalian Meditations, did he offer a systematic explication of his conception of social 
knowledge, being, and truth. In this book, he started once again with the premise that the 
knowledge produced by social analysts must be related to the conditions of intellectual 
work and to the peculiar dispositions fostered by the scholastic universe. He laid out his 
philosophical anthropology, in which human action is guided not by “interests” but by the 
struggle for practical efficacy and pursuit of recognition, whose form will be determined 
by particular locations in collective and individual histories. He clarified his agonistic 
view of the social world, anchored not by the notion of “reproduction” but by that of 
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struggle (itself internally linked to recognition). And he showed why epistemic--as 
distinguished from narcissistic—reflexivity mandates a commitment to “historical 
rationalism,” and not relativism. 
 
 “Historical rationalism” was a theme from Bourdieu’s teachers Bachelard, 
Vuillemin, and Canguilhem (who also shaped many others of his “poststructuralist” 
generation including Foucault and Derrida). Bourdieu’s debt to it helps us see why, even 
while he was an important master of structuralist analysis, he also rejected the 
structuralist refusal of history. Bourdieu was not a theorist of deep epistemic ruptures 
(like Foucault in 1966). Rather he wrestled with the complexities of partial 
transformation and partial reproduction; with the multiple, ubiquitous temporalities of 
social life; and with the embeddedness of knowledge itself in historical practice. 
 
Bourdieu’s distinctive concepts were developed largely as tools with which to 
grasp these transformations, resistance to each, and the possibilities each opened up. He 
drew on important intellectual influences from Marx, Weber, and Durkheim through 
Mauss, Merleau-Ponty, and Lévi-Strauss.  
 
Bourdieu’s work on Algeria stresses the tension between the relatively 
undifferentiated traditional order and development conceived as transition to a society in 
which the economic field had a kind of differentiated autonomy. His later arguments 
against neoliberal globalization, by contrast, focus on the threats posed by 
dedifferentiation, a loss of autonomy by fields other than the economy. There are 
common threads: crucially, the lack of preparation of large segments of the population for 
the new conditions and the introduction of new inequalities without systems of social 
reciprocity to mitigate their effects. But Bourdieu does not offer a strong account of how 
and why economic capital should have its distinctive powers, and to what extent these are 
specific to or take a distinctive form in societies that can be called “capitalist”.64 Perhaps 
it is simply the one-sided focus on certain sorts of social practices and values—those 
designated properly economic in capitalism—that both constitutes capitalism and makes 
it powerful (as well as dangerous). 
 
 
 
Bourdieu’s public interventions were, however, firmly rooted in his sociological 
analyses. Indeed, it was his theory of social fields—honed in studies of the religious field, 
the legal field, and the field of cultural production--that informed his defense of the 
autonomy (always only relative) of the scientific field from market pressure. His theory 
of the multiple forms of capital—cultural and social as well as economic—suggested that 
these were indirectly convertible but if they were reduced to simple equivalence cultural 
and social capital lost their specificity and efficacy. And his early studies in Algeria 
showed the corrosive impact of unbridled extension of market forces. 
 
                                                 
64
 See Calhoun, “Habitus, Field, and Capital.” 
